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This paper examines the policy alternatives faced by developing countries in their endeavours to 
preserve and develop their electricity and gas systems, two service-oriented industries that ￿ along 
with oil and coal ￿ provide the bulk of the energy supply in both developed and developing 
countries. Even in very poor countries, industrially generated energy is indispensable for carrying 
out most economic activities. Therefore, Governments traditionally recognize that the supply of 
gas and electricity entails a fundamental public service dimension. Chapter I presents and defines 
the issues of liberalization, deregulation and privatization of energy utilities, and it attempts to 
locate energy reforms in a broader historical framework in which developing countries￿ 
Governments have faced increasing financial hardship. Chapter II reviews some experiences in 
energy sector reforms, focusing on some of the largest semi-industrialized countries in Latin 
America and Asia. A few remarks on the advisability of a flexible approach to reforming energy 




This paper examines some aspects of the policy alternatives faced by developing countries in their 
endeavours to develop and enhance their energy systems, keeping in mind the ongoing multilateral 
trade negotiations. The focus is on electricity and gas, which, along with oil and coal, provide the bulk 
of the industrially generated energy supply to enterprises and households in both developed and 
developing countries. It is well known that the vast majority of the population in least developed 
countries (LDCs), and hundreds of millions of poor inhabitants of non-LDC developing countries do 
not have access to industrially generated energy, especially in rural areas. Even in very poor 
developing countries, the few existing export-oriented economic activities, such as tourism or the 
production and transportation of agricultural or mining commodities, cannot function without a 
minimum supply of industrially generated energy. Therefore, industrially generated energy is 
indispensable for carrying out virtually all ￿modern￿
1 productive and consumption activities, 
especially tradeable ones.
2 Governments have traditionally recognized that, because of its crucial 
enabling function, the supply of gas and electricity has a fundamental public-service dimension, quite 
independently from the property regime and market structure in which the energy utilities operate.  
 
Chapter I presents and defines the issues of liberalization, deregulation and privatization of energy 
utilities, and it attempts to locate the reforms in a broader historical framework characterized by an 
increasing inability on the part of developing countries￿ Governments to meet the financing needs 
involved in the maintenance and expansion of domestic energy supplies. 
                                                 
1 The term ￿modern￿ is used in contrast with traditional economic activities such as subsistence agriculture and 
petty industry and trade. 
2 Electricity and gas are the most widely used technologies employed worldwide to supply energy in nationwide 
or local power networks. However, the observations made in the text apply to other technologies ￿ such as 
nuclear and renewable energies ￿ frequently utilized as alternative means of producing electrical power. Oil is 
also an input for the production of thermal energy. Yet the oil industry as such is chiefly geared towards the 
production and transportation of a tradeable commodity, and thus has characteristics quite different from those of 




Chapter II reviews some experiences in energy sector reforms, focusing on some of the largest semi-
industrialized countries in Latin America and Asia. A few remarks on the advisability of a flexible 
approach to reforming energy regimes in developing countries conclude the paper. 
 
 
I.   OPENING ENERGY UTILITIES TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
 
1. Liberalization, deregulation and privatization 
The worldwide trend in favour of trade openness, market regulation, and the retreat of the State from 
economic activities, which peaked in the 1990s
3 and still informs the reform programs of many 
developing countries and the agenda of international financial institutions, did not leave out energy 
utilities. 
 
Liberalization of a sector of economic activity strongly intervened and regulated by the Government 
consists, broadly speaking, in shifting it towards market regulation, guided by the principles of free 
competition. Deregulation, de-statization and privatization are techniques or instruments utilized for 
this purpose. Deregulation is a change from interventionist regulation to pro-libertate regulation, 
taking of course into account that once certain norms are abolished, they must to some extent be 
replaced by others, with the object of guaranteeing the effective functioning of the market. (For this 
reason, some analysts prefer to use the more neutral term ￿re-regulation￿.) De-statization of economic 
activities means that those parts of economic activity that used to be considered a public service, and 
therefore were left to the State, are open to the intervention of private operators.
4 Finally, privatization 
means transfer of the ownership of a public enterprise so as to transform it into a private enterprise. 
Privatization sometimes requires the ￿atomization￿ (i.e., unbundling) of the enterprise. 
 
The most widespread argument in favour of these reforms is that state-owned enterprises are 
intrinsically inefficient and are bound to be mismanaged, and that therefore a change of property rights 
will in itself lead to improved performance.
5 In a complementary fashion, liberalization is seen as a 
tool aimed at the creation of markets through the promotion of free competition (Trillo-Figueroa, 
1993).  
 
Notwithstanding the partial validity of these theoretical arguments, empirical evidence on the 
comparative performance of publicly and privately owned enterprises (especially in the case of 
                                                 
3 The radical neoliberal position epitomized by the Washington Consensus was weakened in the late 1990s by a 
number of previously unforeseen and interrelated events, among them the Asian crisis, the failure of the Seattle 
round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, and the surge of a mass opposition movement in many 
developed countries. As a result, the dominant orthodoxy is presently more nuanced; it has been dubbed the 
￿enlightened standard view￿ by a leading international economist (Rodrik, 2001). 
4 Naturally, to the extent that they do embody a public service component, they are still bound to be subject to 
new forms of public regulation. 
5 This argument is further developed by more sophisticated analyses exploring the underlying theoretical and 
practical reasons: under a public property regime, enterprise managers face an inadequate incentive structure, 
while privatization forces them to focus on a clear-cut and unequivocal goal, the maximization of shareholder 
value. Another, related argument maintains that senior managers in state-owned companies are locked into the 
contradictions and distortions implied by the principal-agent relationship and by the asymmetry of information 
between them and their supervisory bodies, and that they are therefore far less accountable than they would be 
under a private property regime. According to the theory of public choice, managers of state-owned enterprises 
are thus likely to engage in rent-seeking behavior, resulting in suboptimal provision of public goods and services 
and in multiple allocative and productive inefficiencies (Peacock, 1992; Vickers and Yarrow, 1989).  
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utilities bound by public-service obligations) is inconclusive, as ownership of an enterprise matters 
little to its performance. Of far greater importance is the context in which the enterprise operates. 
Therefore, to improve the performance of energy utilities, a number of measures might be taken, 
largely independently of the property regime as such. The degree of competition of energy markets 
could be increased, forcing firms to achieve production efficiencies, ruling out the possibility of 
realizing extra profit at the expense of consumers, and thus driving prices down. Signals to 
management and incentives could be improved and made more transparent, increasing management￿s 
autonomy in day-to-day operations and correspondingly reducing government interference. In some 
cases, even in a public or partly public property regime, the constraints and opportunities stemming 
from capital markets can play a role in improving financial discipline and ￿ along with adequate 
incentives ￿ in inducing virtuous behaviour on the part of managers. Unfortunately, in many real-life 
attempts to implement the aforementioned measures, and especially to effectively enhance the degree 
of competition in which an energy utility operates, are greatly hampered, particularly in the developing 
world.  
 
2. Quality of management and quantity of investment 
As a general rule, the power sector in developing countries performs poorly. Plant availability is 
scarce (on average less than 50 per cent, versus 80￿85 per cent in the United States),
6 transmission 
losses are high (over 30 per cent against 7￿8 per cent in the United States), blackouts and brownouts 
are common, and many state-owned power utilities are in serious financial hardship (Stevens, 1998:1; 
see also Barnett, 1992; Munasinghe, 1992; Schram, 1993). However, it is difficult to determine to 
what extent these problems are specific to state-managed power sectors rather than a byproduct of the 
very (relative) underdevelopment dimension, which would in any case affect the State￿s regulatory 
capacity owing to multiple institutional shortcomings. Moreover, many government-owned power 
systems in developing countries do function efficiently, as for instance in Jordan and Thailand and in 
some Indian States (Sullivan, 1990). The bottom line is that the demand for energy in the developing 
world, driven both by economic activities and by the legitimate aspiration of large numbers of poor 
people to achieve the minimal comfort levels to which their counterparts in the North have been 
accustomed for a long time, tends to grow much faster than Governments￿ abilities to finance the 
expansion of supply capacity. This gap has grown much more dramatic since the 1970s, as the 
weakening of the State￿s economic power in many developing countries has been accompanied by a 
progressive drying up of the multilateral financing sources that were relatively abundant in the first 
development period after World War II. In other words, rather than facing a problem of quality of 
energy management, Governments in developing countries often face a problem of quantity, since the 
money needed for investments in energy capacity and facilities is lacking.  
 
This tension was acknowledged as early as 1990 by one of the staunchest and most influential 
advocates of neoliberal reforms in the developing world, the United States Agency for International 
Development. One of its officers, in an article on the early experiences and perspectives of developing 
countries in developing private power supplies, observed that the growth rate of installed capacity in 
the developing world averaged 6.5 per cent, against 3￿5 per cent in Organisation for Economic   
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, pointing to a $100 billion per year financing bill 
over the 1990s: ￿These funds are not, and will not be, available from public treasuries￿ (Sullivan, 
1990:336).  
                                                 
6 Plant availability measures the ratio between the effective working hours of a power plant over a year and the 
theoretical maximum possible working hours (24 hours multiplied by 365). A plant availability of 50 per cent 







Alternative institutional and legal settings for energy regimes 
 
In the international commercial terminology, privatization usually corresponds to Buy-build-operate 
arrangements (BBO): a private agent buys existing assets from the State (often with an engagement to 
upgrade them), retains ownership and is guaranteed the right to exploit it for an indefinite period of time. In 
many cases, however, the main problem with energy utilities in developing countries is not one of hopeless 
inefficiency (which would suggest privatization as a radical solution) but rather one of insufficiency: the 
Government lacks the financial, managerial, and institutional resources to build up and run new facilities at 
the speed required by development needs. It can let a private operator build the facility, choosing one of the 
following policy options: 
 
•  Build-own-operate (BOO): The private agent retains the ownership of the facility and the right 
to operate it for an indefinite period of time. A similar arrangement is the independent power 
producer (IPP), under which the private operator sells power to the government grid, without 
formal previous obligation to limit its profits or to eventually surrender ownership of the 
facility. 
•  Build-transfer-operate (BTO): The private agent transfers ownership of the facility to the State 
after completing the construction stage, and operates it thereafter. 
•  Build-operate-transfer (BOT): he private agent builds the facility and retains ownership and the 
right to exploit for a specified period of time, thus recovering construction, operating, and 
financial expenditure. At the end of the period, ownership reverts to the State at a symbolic 
cost. 
 
It is also possible for a Government, on the one hand, to consider that existing state-owned facilities might be 
more efficiently run by a private operator, but, on the other hand, to be reluctant to permanently surrender 
ownership rights. The Government has the option of granting temporary exploitation rights to a private 
operator, whether through a concession (which entails full commercial risks and responsibility for new fixed 
investments), a service contract (which covers more limited operation and maintenance functions), or a lease 
contract. In the latter case, the private company is given the right to the revenue stream from the service in 
return for full operation and maintenance responsibilities. It pays a rental fee to the Government but does not 
engage in new investments. 
 
 
3. Is private capital really additional? 
Thus, developing countries are left with the option of courting private investors. Here they can opt for 
privatization/divestiture, according to the classical United Kingdom example, or foster the 
development of newly established independent power generating facilities (see box 1). In the late 
1980s the first reform path was pioneered in the developing world by Chile, and the second by China, 
which were subsequently followed by many other countries. Mixed and intermediate approaches are 
also common, with private utilities coexisting with public ones in many countries, among them India 
(Sullivan, 1990:337). Whatever option is chosen, and leaving aside for the moment the crucial 
question of the respective long-term strategic development implications of the two reform paths, 
policy makers need to keep in mind that the most pressing goal of providing the energy industry with 
more financing in the short to medium term is not likely to be achieved automatically. This will 
happen only if ￿private capital is truly additional￿ (Sullivan, 1990:338). If, on the other hand, 
sovereign guarantees are needed to obtain equity or debt in foreign exchange, private capital may 
actually become a substitute for existing funds, because of the country￿s international credit exposure. 
Local currency availability may also be scarce, especially in countries with poorly developed capital 




Therefore, in the case of divestiture of a state-owned monopolistic utility, financial benefits are likely 
to accrue to the reforming country only if the hoped-for benefits stemming from competition and, 
possibly, other efficiency gains related to private management counterbalance at least the additional 
financial costs typical of international private capital markets. This condition, however, is necessary 
but not sufficient for the reform to be considered welfare-enhancing from the point of view of the 
general public.
7 For this purpose it is also necessary that the efficiency gain be large enough to be 
shared by the private utility operator and the consumers, and that an adequate institutional and 
regulatory mechanism be enacted to assure that the benefits are actually distributed according to policy 
goals.
8 The ability to undertake such policy design and implementation, while not unheard of, should 




II.   REFORMING ENERGY OWNERSHIP AND REGULATORY REGIMES: 
EXPERIENCES IN SEMI-INDUSTRIALIZED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
1. Structural reforms of energy utilities in the 1990s and earlier 
Until the early 1990s, significant reforms of traditional state-owned energy monopolies were 
infrequent in OECD countries (being virtually confined to Anglo-Saxon members), and even more so 
in the developing world.
10 The pioneering experiences of Chile and China in the 1980s, which have 
been rightly considered as paradigmatic and ￿ especially with the benefit of hindsight ￿ more 
successful than the norm, will be examined in Chapter II.3 below. As was mentioned earlier, Chile and 
China pioneered power market-oriented system reforms in the developing world. Both countries￿ 
reform strategies were gradual and rather successful, but they differed markedly in nature. Chile 
pointed towards divestiture, privatization, and the progressive withdrawal of the State from 
management of the power industry (albeit without forfeiting its regulatory function). China, on the 
other hand, saw the role of private investors as complementary and additional with respect to that of 
public enterprises. 
 
                                                 
7 This observation is static and would not, of course, apply in practice to extreme cases where the only realistic 
alternative to divestiture would be the collapse of a bankrupt and moribund state-owned facility. 
8 On the importance of regulation, see, for instance, W￿lde and Gunst, 2003. 
9 As in most economic sectors, push the tendency towards deregulation and privatization of energy systems too 
far can have unintended negative technological and environmental consequences in the long run (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1989; Peacock, 1992). An enhanced market orientation on the part of utility operators ￿ which 
constitutes one of the main goals of the reforms ￿ can lead towards exclusively profit-oriented short-term 
behaviour, while goals such as combating pollution or pursuing long-term research and development (R&D) 
projects aimed at the realization of clean and environmental technologies are sidelined. Actually, in the United 
States as in other OECD countries, the level of public support for energy R&D programs has declined 
dramatically in recent years. In the United States, in particular, private R&D funding also fell (Dooley, 1998). 
10 The partial or total liberalization/privatization of an important and traditionally state-dominated sector such as 
energy is likely to be easier to implement in a developed than in a developing country. In a developed country, in 
fact, the energy sector tends to be rather mature and well-established, and thus less pivotal and strategic from the 
point of view of economic sustainability and national security than in earlier development stages. The maturity 
of a sector, in fact, implies that its technology is not a frontier one and hence can be mastered with some ease by 
national private agents. The actual and perspective market for energy, moreover, is likely to be large enough to 
create at least the potential for a certain degree of competition. Yet, in the developing world, the above 
arguments can be overshadowed by other arguments, among them the frequency of quasi-emergency situations 
caused by economic imbalances and the decay of basic infrastructure, and the perennial hunger for finance and 
technology. In developing countries endowed with ample and still largely untapped natural resources, 
furthermore, this potential wealth can have an ambiguous impact on energy policies. On the one hand, it 
enhances the strategic character of the energy sector, strengthening the rationale for strong state intervention. On 
the other hand, it increases the urgency of acquiring updated technology to adequately exploit the energy 
potential, thus arguing in favour of leaving ample room for the operations of advanced transnational 
corporations.   
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Most structural energy sector reforms took place in the 1990s. The energy sector has been one of those 
most affected by privatization worldwide, with a global value of property transfers estimated at US$37 
billion in 1996, corresponding to around one-fourth of all privatization exercises carried out in that 
period (Lutz, 2001:25). According to another estimate, between 1992 and the late 1990s ￿ the golden 
era of the Washington Consensus ￿ about 20 privatizations of state-owned oil and gas industries took 
place all over the world, involving 15 countries. In eight cases, the Government retained a majority 
holding. Electricity industry reforms followed a similar path, and in most reforming countries most 
changes consisted of deregulation and the promotion of new private investments, rather than in the 
divestiture of state-owned utilities (Stevens, 1998; Thomas, 1997). These figures, albeit impressive, 
amount to less than what might have been expected taking into account the ideological climate of the 
time, reflecting the array of problems and constraints implied by energy privatization.  
 
The analysis in the remainder of this chapter will focus on the cases of large, semi-industrialized 
countries, for two reasons. First, these are the experiences for which the most information is available. 
Second, in these countries the challenge of preserving and developing a national energy industry 
currently constitutes a strategic priority.
11 However, a few remarks will be made regarding other 
developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
12  
 
2. Latin America: widespread energy sector privatization 
Total or partial privatization of energy subsectors has proceeded quite fast in many countries in Latin 
America, as the region has been the most consistent follower of the Washington Consensus policies 
promoted by international financial institutions.
13  In fact, Latin America contributed to about 40 per 
cent of the total value of energy privatizations worldwide (Lutz, 2001:26). Energy reforms in Chile 
and Argentina were the deepest and most radical. In Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, electricity markets 
were restructured and opened to competition. Reforms in Brazil and Mexico were more cautious and 
                                                 
11 Improving and expanding access to reliable energy sources is a necessary condition for development in every 
country. However, for historical reasons, semi-industrialized countries are particularly well placed to reap the 
potential synergic gains (in terms of overall industrial and technological upgrading) stemming from development 
of the energy sector.  
12 Since this paper focuses on developing countries, experiences in structural reforms in energy services in 
developed and transition countries are not covered in the short review of case studies presented in this chapter. 
Rather, they are very briefly referred to in this note.  
The pioneering British experience with electricity and gas privatization has been studied and variously 
evaluated by numerous analysts (see, for instance, Stern, 1997; Rutledge and Wright, 1998; Yarrow, 1986 and 
1996; Vickers and Yarrow, 1989; Hunt and Shuttleworth, 1996; Weir, 1999; Thomas, 1999, 2000a and 2000b). 
Arguably, the heavy requirements in terms of regulatory complexity constitute its most durable lesson. The still-
embryonic energy market of the European Union, which holds the potential for significant welfare gains, still 
requires for its smooth functioning a series of converging market-friendly changes in the respective national 
energy regimes, which are occurring at different paces in the various member countries (Sioshansi, 2000; Lutz, 
2001). Among extra-European reform experiences in the industrialized world, California’s ill-fated electricity 
liberalization has been the object of particularly wide attention by both scholars and the media (Sioshani, 2001; 
Economist, 2001).  
Energy sector reforms in those European and Asian transition countries that formerly belonged to the 
COMECON are not covered in this paper. Energy reforms in former COMECON countries took place after the 
collapse of those mutually integrated centrally planned economies, in a crisis or post-crisis setting characterized 
by the transition towards a completely different market-based system. Therefore, more than from the vantage 
point of improving the efficiency and the effectiveness of energy utilities per se, they should be seen and 
evaluated as components of a broader strategy aimed at the total rebuilding of the economy as a whole. (On 
energy-sector reform in transition countries and the severe problems faced by energy regulators see, for instance, 
World Bank 2000; Von Hirshhausen and Vincentz 2000; Yekhanurov 2000; Dahl and Kuralbayeva 2001; 
Bannikov 2000.) 
13 For a critical balance of the results of the New Economic Model in Latin America, see, for instance, a special 




14 Venezuela is considering partial reforms of the gas and electricity sectors that would 
maintain a strong role for the State in designing and implementing a competitiveness-enhancing and 
development-oriented energy strategy. 
 
The reforms were instrumental in facilitating two important structural developments that profoundly 
changed the energy landscape in the region: the increase in the absolute and relative role of foreign 
investors and the surge of natural gas as a new, abundant energy source made particularly competitive 
by the availability of modern and relatively less capital-intensive technologies (Lutz, 2001). However, 
from one country to another, the reforms achieved uneven results with respect to the goals of 
increasing efficiency, boosting productivity, relieving public budgets and fostering capacity 
expansion. Especially in those countries where privatization is furthest along, the structural 
contradiction caused by the attempt to promote competition in oligopolistic service-oriented sectors, 
where powerful transnational corporations often face weak national States and poorly organized 
consumers, has not withered. Consequently, the tensions between private efficiency and profitability, 
on the one hand, and public service and development goals, on the other hand, have not been fully 
overcome either.  
 
3. Energy reforms in Chile: early start and gradual implementation 
In Chile, during the 1970s, subsequent steps were undertaken to reduce the presence of the State in the 
power industry. The electricity industry developed a rational planning sequence: distribution 
companies were the first to be privatized, followed by power generation, according to the pragmatic 
criterion of proceeding first with the most profitable enterprises. ENDESA, the largest state-owned 
enterprise that had a dominant role in the sector, was maintained under State control. After the 
progressive privatization of distribution companies, the Government proceeded cautiously with 
(mostly partial) offerings in power-generating companies, opening them up as well to foreign 
investment. The privatization process was carried out over a long period of time, and the first shares of 
ENDESA were sold only in 1987. ENDESA shares were sold through the stock market, and an effort 
was made to present it as a model of ￿broadened ownership￿ and ￿popular capitalism￿: A small part 
was reserved for employees and sold at a discount, and a larger one was reserved to a special class of 
￿small-scale ￿ purchasers, who enjoyed very favorable financial and fiscal advantages (Sullivan, 
1990).  
 
While private firms were welcome to enter the energy sector, the Government of Chile remained in 
charge of most regulatory functions. Tariff and regulatory issues have been handled rather effectively 
by the National Commission of Energy, and the overall performance of the privatized energy system 
was relatively satisfactory up to the late 1990s (Bernstein, 1988). However, the regulatory bodies were 
still not endowed with sufficient powers and capabilities to achieve a fully satisfactory degree of 
control of the operations and strategies of powerful private companies. Moreover, unbundling and 
privatization of the power sector were not accompanied by adequate restrictions on ownership 
concentration. The result was a less-than-optimal degree of competition, with the transfer to private 
operators of significant monopolistic advantages (Lutz, 2001:12). The Chilean power sector remained 
a highly oligopolistic, vertically integrated industry acting in a very imperfect competitive context, 
while the legal and regulatory framework (still one of the most effective in the developing world, 
                                                 
14 While Brazil underwent a privatization process (see below), Mexico, like Central American countries, 
maintained vertical integration in the power sector, while allowing private electricity generators to set up new 
additional capacity and sell it to the national electricity utility.  
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thanks in part to a national tradition of almost non-existent corruption and of high professionalism 
among Chilean public servants), was slow in adapting to the evolving situation.  
 
By the end of 1998 a serious energy crisis erupted. The proximate cause was a drought, but its impact 
was compounded by technical failures, delays in the operational setting of combined-cycle natural gas 
plants, and problems with coordination and transparency in the activities of power-generating 
enterprises. The crisis revealed a number of structural shortcomings, among them the inadequacies of 
the regulatory and institutional framework, the relative weakness of public bodies in dealing with 
short-term profit-oriented private firms, and the lack of a long-term energy strategy. According to a 
study by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the crisis 
showed that economic efficiency criteria were not sufficient to guarantee satisfactory performance of 
the energy system. Market mechanisms should be improved and made more transparent, correcting the 
imperfections stemming from imperfect competition and asymmetry of information, while the 
regulatory bodies are to be revamped and strengthened (Rozas Balbontin, 1999). Notwithstanding 
these problems, the Chilean experience still stands among the most successful on the subcontinent. It 
is also made particularly interesting by the exceptional role played by cross-border energy trade, 
which has allowed Chile to overcome a crisis in the domestic coal industry, as consumption shifted 
towards natural gas imported from Argentina. The latter change in energy sources also contributed 
significantly to progress in the domain of environment protection.
15  
 
4. Brazil: electricity privatization and energy crisis 
Brazil managed to increase its electricity supply capacity by 500 per cent in the last half-century under 
the traditional public-monopoly regime. The electricity system was complex, formed by several state-
based generation and distribution companies. It ran into trouble in the 1980s, as the Ministry of 
Treasury imposed price caps on tariffs as a macroeconomic anti-inflationary tool. The utility￿s 
financial crisis and the subsequent decay in investment activity prompted calls for British-style reform, 
which was initiated in 1993. However, the creation of a truly competitive market for power generation 
in Brazil was bound to be extremely difficult, given that over 90 per cent of electricity is accounted for 
by hydropower (Schaeffer and Salem Szklo, 2001). Hydropower technology, especially in a semi-
industrialized country, implies production conditions characterized by huge economies of scale, and 
therefore a regime close to that of a natural monopoly.  
 
Nevertheless, privatization was a particularly attractive option in heavily debt-ridden Brazil, more for 
financial than for economic reasons (Mendonca and Dahl, 1999:81). From this point of view, it can be 
argued that the Government was successful in privatizing most assets of the industry, as it raised more 
than US$15 billion by mid-1998. The reform plans envisaged that foreign investors and independent 
power producers would operate in the newly opened electricity market. An independent transmission 
grid and a new regulatory agency were also set up. Yet the regulatory regime proved inadequate. 
Tariff and price policies, in particular, were ill conceived, as they allowed monopolistic rents to be 
captured by distribution companies while failing to offer sufficient incentives to potential new 
investors in new capacity generation, who were already penalized by high interest rates (Mendonca 
and Dahl, 1999). As a result, generation capacity grew much less than reformers had hoped. This 
setback was particularly disappointing in a country where electricity demand tends to increase almost 
                                                 
15 Building on its more than two decades of experience in reforming energy utilities, Chile tabled a proposal on 
energy services in the framework of ongoing WTO negotiations. The proposal aims at ￿reinforcing the 
development of energy services in competitive and transparent markets; embracing the whole spectrum of 
energy services in the negotiations; ensuring marketing access, while respecting domestic regulations; and 
analyzing the issue of subsidies in the energy sector￿ (WTO, 2003).  
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three times faster annually than the gross domestic product (GDP). The risk of blackouts increased
16 
and, partly because of poor rainfall, a severe energy crisis erupted in 2001. In June the Government 
launched official instructions to the population to achieve a much-needed 20 per cent decrease in 
usage through voluntary energy savings (Dyer, 2001). This measure could not, however, bring more 
than partial and temporary relief. By early 2002, the Government was proposing sweeping reforms 
that would increase State regulation and intervention (Financial Times, 2002).
17 In the long run, the 
Government￿s tackling of the energy issue will be further complicated by the need to upgrade and 
reconvert power generation capacity using technologies compatible with environmental-protection 
targets.  
 
The sobering warning stemming from the multiple flaws in the privatization of utilities and the 
emergency of power emergencies in Brazil, along with the partially analogous experience of the power 
crisis in California, was not lost on participants in the UNCTAD Expert Meeting on Energy Services 
in International Trade (held in Geneva in July 2001). According to the Chairperson￿s Summary, the 
debate showed that 
 
The lesson which can be drawn from these (power emergencies in California and Brazil) is that 
before creating a new framework for the energy sector, each country has to study carefully the 
features of its market and the related needs. The possibility of adopting solutions existing in other 
countries is limited since conditions vary greatly between countrie ￿ (UNCTAD 2001b:11￿12) 
 
 
5. Argentina: mixed results of energy utilities privatizations 
In Argentina, the gas sector, which is particularly important for its role as a primary source of 
electricity generation (Campodonico, 1999), underwent thorough regulatory and structural reforms in 
the early 1990s. The reforms were market-oriented, according to the United Kingdom model, and 
aimed to increase efficiency and foster private investment in the gas industry. Both the downstream 
gas company, Gas del Estado (GdE), and the upstream oil and gas company, Yacimentos Petroleros 
Fiscales (YPF), were privatized. GdE was also broken up into two transmission companies and eight 
(later nine) distribution companies. An open-access regime was established, price controls were 
removed, and an independent regulatory agency (ENARGAS) was created. The functions of the 
agency were very complex: they covered the preservation of market competition, the protection of the 
public service functions of gas supply and distribution, the prohibition of vertical integration among 
privately operated utilities, the monitoring of wholesale gas prices, the approval of gas transportation 
and distribution tariffs, and the supervision of fiscal subsidies. Analogous regulatory functions are or 
should be fulfilled by regulatory agencies in other Latin American countries that implemented similar 
gas-industry reforms, notably Chile and Bolivia (Campodonico, 1999). 
 
In the case of Argentina, where structural conditions were favourable to the emergence of a certain 
degree of true competition, even taking for granted that ENARGAS would have had a hard time 
fulfilling all its multifaceted regulatory obligations, the first stages of gas industry reform appear to 
have been relatively well planned and successful. Gas drilling and investment have increased and 
supply reliability has improved, while prices have remained competitive (IEA, 1999). However, after 
10 years of reform, the gas and electricity industries in Argentina still faced an array of problems, 
                                                 
16 According to an estimate, the loss of load probability in three large Brazilian regions in 2000￿2001 was about 
12 per cent (Schaeffer and Salem Szklo, 2001:358). 
17 Pedro Parente, the minister heading Brazil’s energy task force, stated: ￿The market is not enough to ensure an 




typical of privatized energy utilities in developing countries. In the rapidly developing gas sector, the 
market was oligopolistic, dominated by a small number of vertically integrated suppliers obtaining 
extraordinary benefits. Tariffs increased noticeably in dollar terms, while consumers did not show 
strong opposition, as they were largely spared price increases in pesos due to the progressive 
overvaluation of the dollar-pegged Argentinian currency (Kozulj, 2000). In the long run, however, this 
phenomenon contributed to the development of the present, severe financial crisis. In the electricity 
sector, conversely, the degree of competition has been higher, mainly because of the effective vertical 
and horizontal de-integration introduced by the reforms. Still, part because of a lack of comprehensive 
planning, private operators appear to have over-invested in generating capacity and under-invested in 
transportation. By the end of the decade, as in many other countries, long energy breakouts occurred in 
Argentina, re-opening the issue of the reliability of supply and of the essential public service function 
of electrical utilities (Kozulj, 2000; Pistonesi, 2000). 
 
6. Africa and East Asia: energy sector restructuring under divergent structural conditions 
In Africa and Asia the approach to energy sector reforms so far has been less radical than in Latin 
America. Most countries have pursued mixed energy regimes that maintain an important role for the 
State. Results, however, have been uneven. Apart from the specific features of each country￿s unique 
experience, a major difference tends to hold between the two developing regions.  
 
In Africa, during the first post-independence period, many countries managed to achieve a certain 
development of their power industry, which was starting almost from scratch, under the then-dominant 
model of integrated state-owned monopoly. When economic crises erupted in the 1980s, African 
energy systems were not immune to the systemic long-run decay that hit the whole of their economic 
and social fabric. Public services and the economic functions of the State were particularly affected. 
The power industry and its inefficiencies were criticized, and Governments came under strong 
pressure on the part of international financial institutions to privatize and liberalize the industry. Most 
countries initiated reform plans, but so far few have enacted major changes in their statutory system. 
The others are at different stages of the reform process, but they show little enthusiasm and 
determination in this endeavour, as it implies serious social and political risks, besides being difficult 
to implement from a technical and institutional point of view. Countries are more eager to authorize 
foreign private firms to initiate new independent power production and interconnection development 
projects (Girod and Percebois, 1998). 
 
In a quite opposite development, East Asian energy systems, which performed rather well in the past, 
underwent a ￿growth crisis￿ as demand for energy ballooned, fuelled by the very rapid growth of the 
economy as a whole, and had to search for additional sources of financing for their ever-increasing 
investment needs. East Asian electricity industries, traditionally dominated by vertically integrated 
state-owned utilities, are changing into ones in which multiple agents interact in a partially 
competitive environment. The ever-increasing need for financing, rather than the perception of 
inefficiencies in the public utilities, is the engine of the present restructuring drive. As demand for 
energy grows faster than gross national product (GNP), financing needs for power generation increase 
almost exponentially,
18 pushing Governments to seek additional funds from domestic and international 
private sources. Previously existing public monopolies are being opened to private investors. Most 
countries are implementing independent power producer (IPP) programmes, encouraging private 
operators to develop new power projects. Build-own-operate (BOO), build-own-transfer (BOT), and 
                                                 
18 Because Asia is the fastest-growing region in the world, demand for electricity has been skyrocketing, at a rate 
of 10 per cent a year in many countries.  
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build-transfer-operate (BTO) arrangements are also popular. Thus, there are now several players in the 
power-generation business.
19 Usually, the public transmission agency buys the privately produced 
energy under a power purchase agreement (PPA).
20 In a parallel development, power ministries or 
authorities are being restructured in a more commercially oriented fashion, and their status is being 
changed into that of corporations (e.g. in China, Indonesia and Viet Nam). In some countries (e.g. 
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand), existing state-owned assets in the electricity 
industry have been partially or totally privatized. The reforms require complex regulatory changes in 
order to adequately prepare the regulatory regime for the challenges of a pluralistic yet only partially 
competitive market, while at the same time preserving the strategic and planning functions of the State 
and fulfilling social and public service obligations.
21 The experiences with power-industry reforms 
carried out in the two most populous developing countries in Asia and in the world, India and China, 
are briefly reviewed in the two following sections. 
 
7. India:  a decentralized approach to reform of the energy generation sector  
India￿s coal-dominated power industry developed quickly after independence, with generation 
capacity increasing from 1400 megawatts in 1947 to around 90,000 megawatts by the end of the 
century (Singh Yadav and Jain, 1999). However, per-capita power consumption in India is still among 
the world￿s lowest, at 300 kilowatt-hours against 13,000 kilowatt-hours in the United States, with 
supply chronically unable to match demand. More than 50 per cent of total energy demand proceeds 
from the industrial sector, and the demand is growing steadily, about 5 per cent yearly. Besides the 
inevitable growth in energy consumption resulting from the industrialization process itself, energy 





The Indian power industry has traditionally been fully controlled by individual States. By the early 
1990s, it was plagued by the conventional problems of monopolistic public utilities in developing 
countries ￿ insufficient capitalization and investments, politically determined low tariffs, overstaffing, 
suboptimal management ￿ aggravated by interstate rivalries. The main problems were the low share of 
(renewable) hydroelectric power in total capacity (in spite of India￿s high potential), the skewed tariff 
structure that excessively subsidized domestic and agricultural energy consumption, and ￿ partly as a 
result of the former ￿ the enormous losses of most State Electricity Boards (SEBs). Reforms fell short 
of outright full-scale privatization, offering generous financial incentives to private investors to 
contribute to the construction and management of new generation capacities to be sold to the 
(monopolistic) State electricity board grids. This strategy, which was geared to mobilize additional 
financial resources rather than to improve the efficient use of already existing capacity, was mired in a 
contradiction. On the one hand, it was bound to imply considerable financial costs for commercially 
produced private power, as government policies permitted producers high depreciation allowances and 
                                                 
19 Transmission tends to remain under exclusive public control. 
20 These important developments do not happen overnight. By the late 1990s, only a small fraction of negotiation 
processes had led to PPAs (Caruso and Chen, 1997:9). 
21 Many countries, for instance, still face a huge task in completing rural electrification. 
22 The concept of total factor productivity is controversial in economic theory (see Felipe, 1999). Here it is 
mentioned to refer in broad terms to productivity gains attributable not to increases in capital and labour, but 
rather to technological and managerial improvements. 
23 Taking into account the size of India’s industry and thus its present and, a fortiori, future contribution to global 
carbon emission, the urgency of improving the energy efficiency both of the power industry and of energy-
intensive industrial subsectors is also of concern for the international community, as it is the case for other large 
semi-industrialized developing countries such as Brazil and China (Mongia, Schumacher and Sathaye, 2001). It 
may be worth remembering that one of the main reasons the Bush administration in the United States gave for 
rejecting the Kyoto covenant on global carbon emission was the lack in that agreement of any specific target for 
emissions reductions on the part of developing countries.  
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indebtedness levels, while private operators, although likely to be more efficient and better placed to 
acquire the latest technologies, were generally too small to achieve economies of scale (Ranganathan, 
1993). On the other hand, the lack of political determination in imposing financial discipline and 
commercial orientation on loss-making SEBs made the risk of financial default on their part quite 
high, discouraging potential investors. The reforms fell short also in the areas of institutional and 
regulatory capacity and policy coordination, while anxiety about securing international financing did 
not contribute to the creation and maintenance of a competitive environment in electricity generation 
(Ranganathan, 1996). 
 
In spite of these and other problems, participation in energy generation in India increased during the 
1990s. India presently permits a variety of ownership structures, and foreign investment in the energy 
sector has been greatly facilitated. In the various States, which had very different problems to begin 
with, reforms are at different stages of implementation (Arun and Nixson, 1998).  
 
8. China: institutional and regulatory reforms, commercial orientation, and enhanced 
market access for foreign investors 
Steady and rapid expansion of the power sector is particularly crucial in China, a very large 
developing country with an exceptionally fast pace of industrialization and overall economic growth. 
Moreover, the future of the power industry in China is extraordinarily relevant to the outside world 
because of the sheer size of the country￿s electrical power sector and the opportunities it presents to 
foreign investors and suppliers, on the one hand, and the relevance of China in international 
endeavours to protect the global environment and reduce carbon dioxide emissions
24 in particular, on 
the other hand. 
 
The Government of China has traditionally placed a high priority on the development of the power 
sector,
25 and early on it initiated experiments with innovative public-private ventures. Actually, the 
first power project properly developed as a build-own-transfer (BOT) venture in a developing country 
was carried out in South China under the initiative of Hopewell Holdings Ltd., a Hong Kong (China)-
based private company (Sullivan, 1990).  
 
In global terms, however, the overall structure of the power sector changed little until the mid-1990s. 
China￿s coal-dominated power industry was quite decentralized, with Provincial Power Companies 
and a number of lower-level entities (more than 10,000) playing important operating roles and 
interacting in a complex web of relations. Therefore, it was particularly difficult for the Government to 
reform and regulate the overall power system. In practice, rather than formal indirect 
 
 
                                                 
24 Until a few years ago, it was commonly forecast that by the year 2020 China would become the first culprit of 
this major form of global pollution, bypassing the United States. This event now looks unlikely: according to a 
study by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California, and to data from the United States 
Department of Energy, carbon emissions in China actually declined in absolute terms by 17 per cent in the last 
four years, while GNP grew by 36 per cent. This unexpected improvement resulted mainly from drastic cuts in 
coal price subsidies and from an array of programs aimed at energy conservation and at curbing urban air 
pollution (Eckholm, 2001). However, the magnitude, albeit not a sign of a correspondingly dramatic 
improvement in energy efficiency, has been subsequently questioned, and even Chinese official sources 
acknowledge the likeliness of statistical inaccuracies. In the long run, anyway, the continuation of the present, 
favourable trend cannot be taken for granted, and continuous policy attention by the Government of China and, 
indirectly, the international community will be needed to the importance of reducing carbon emissions and other 
forms of pollution in the energy sector. 
25 Generating capacity increased from 47 GW in 1976 to 250 GW in 1997 (Andrews-Speed and Dow, 2000), 







FDI in the Chinese power sector 
 
Since the early 1990s, China has progressively increased opportunities for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
electricity generation. China needed FDI mainly because it lacked both the financial resources and the 
manufacturing capacity to produce the quantity of generating equipment needed for the projected expansion 
of the energy sector. Advantages of FDI, apart from those related to financing, relate to the potential for 
improvements in technology, management, and the reduction of pollutant emissions. The Government has 
stressed that the improvement of generating efficiency is an utmost policy priority.  
 
Up to the mid-1990s, foreign financing provided about 10 per cent of investment funds in the power sector, 
but over 80 per cent came from foreign Governments and multilateral lending institutions. By mid-1998, 
24  FDI plants were in operation, and 12 others were in construction, most of them operated by US 
companies. Plants in construction tend to be larger than already operational ones, as well as being more 
advanced technologically and more evenly distributed geographically, owing to changes in government 
policies and investor behaviour (Blackman and Wu, 1999).  
 
FDI in China￿s power sector can be carried out in the framework of various institutional arrangements: 
cooperative joint ventures, wholly owned foreign ventures, equity joint ventures, BOT and BOO projects, 
loans, and stock in existing Chinese enterprises. For foreign investors, cooperative joint ventures constitute a 
practical, middle-of-the-road solution, and they tend to be preferred to wholly owned foreign ventures. They 
allow investors to retain adequate control over the project, while facilitating political and institutional 
alliances with Chinese public entities and access to inputs and foreign exchange. BOT contracts ￿ which can 
be joint, cooperative, or wholly owned ventures ￿ are becoming increasingly popular. 
 
The most effective way to improve the institutional climate for FDI is to codify and streamline the approval 
process. However, it would be unwise to eliminate it altogether and rely exclusively on market-based 
mechanisms such as the competitive bidding procedures, because so far the approval process has allowed a 
certain degree of central control, creating strong incentives to improve energy efficiency and to transfer 
advanced generating technologies (see Blackman and Wu, 1999; Andrew-Speed and Dow, 2000). 
 
 
regulation, direct supervision by higher-level government bodies, as well as horizontal and vertical 
inter-agency negotiations leading to consensus solutions, were the norms. This system weakened the 
ability of the centre to effectively supervise the provinces, and it was not without costs. With respect 
to the key task of constructing new generating capacity, in particular, it tended to provoke long delays 
in the approval process, or its outright avoidance, while encouraging the construction of small and 
inefficient plants to skip the need of approval from the centre. 
 
Increasing awareness of the seriousness of these systemic weaknesses led to a series of reforms, which 
culminated in 1996 in the approval of a new Electricity Law that created the State Power Corporation 
of China (SPCC) as an entity separate from the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP). The law was the 
first step in a complex reform process, to be seen at its stage as an integral part of the wider 
restructuring and overhauling of state-owned enterprises, which in its turn constitutes the core of 
industrial reforms. 
 
The main goals of the Government are:  to increase the capacity to generate, trade and effectively 
deliver power across the whole nation; to attract FDI into the energy sector in order to alleviate the 
State￿s financial burden in financing ever-increasing investment needs (see box 2); to raise productive 
efficiency, reducing costs and passing benefits to the consumer; to improve the energy efficiency of 
end users, using increases in average tariffs along with other policy tools; and to reduce the negative  
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environmental impact of the energy industry, diminishing the presently excessive weight of small 
thermal-power generation units. 
 
These goals are being pursued in the context of enhanced ￿ albeit far from exclusive ￿ reliance on the 
progressive creation of a properly regulated and competitive market for electrical power. Since the 
introduction of market mechanisms inevitably involves significant transitional costs and institutional 
hurdles, reformers are trying to promote competition first in the domains of plant construction, 
operation and management. Regulation of competitive tendering for plant construction has been 
introduced, and competition is in fact strong even when confined purely to publicly owned Chinese 
firms. Progress in achieving transparency and competition in operation and management appears to be 
slower.  
 
The ownership regime in the power industry is undergoing progressive changes, although total 
privatization (as in Chile, New Zealand or the United Kingdom) is out of the question. Ownership 
rights are reallocated in order to increase the autonomy of power-generating companies, and to create 
new local generating enterprises. A certain degree of control, however, remains in the hands of the 
State Power Corporation as the ultimate owner of a majority holding in many of these companies. 
 
Policy caution is, however, warranted. If pursued to the end, market-oriented reforms would imply 
loss by the State (which in China has traditionally been stronger than in most other developing 
countries) of its ability to use the power sector as a policy tool ￿ for instance to control inflation, or to 
promote rural electrification, or even to foster technological upgrading. Thus, the treatment of 





The energy sector is one of the most strategic ones from a development perspective. Energy utilities, 
moreover, are characterized by a public-service component and have traditionally been run as 
integrated public monopolies in most countries. Developing and transition countries should strive to 
reap the potential benefits of globalization and new technologies, but without underestimating  the 
risks and problems stemming from  market failures, the tendency towards private monopolies, and the 
limits of regulatory power (Solanes, 1999). These countries face several policy options in dealing with 
their national energy sectors in the ongoing international trade negotiations. On the one hand, the need 
to obtain access to financial resources and technologies not available domestically, and, in some cases, 
the financial and practical impossibility of maintaining the traditional State monopoly in energy 
utilities cannot be ignored. On the other hand, the problems related to outright privatization are being 
increasingly recognized both in theory and in practice. 
 
Therefore, Governments in developing and transition countries might find it advisable to adopt a 
flexible and multifaceted approach to energy reforms. In their trading relations with international 
commercial operators, in particular, they can opt for intermediate institutional arrangements. Some of 
these arrangements (e.g. BOT, IPP) are briefly referred to in Chapter II, but it is likely that the 
increasing sophistication and flexibility of alternative technological solutions and the accumulation of 
legal expertise in a relatively new domain of international trade relations will soon expand the range of 




These policy suggestions, drawn from the multifaceted lessons that can be extracted from many 
developing countries￿ experiences with reforming power utilities regimes, are quite consistent with the 
thrust of the debate that took place at UNCTAD￿s Expert Meeting on Energy Services in International 
Trade (Geneva, July 2001) (UNCTAD, 2001a; UNCTAD, 2001b; Zarrilli, 2003). The background 
note prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat recognized, in particular, that 
 
Progressive liberalization of market access conditions for energy services should be pursued, 
taking into account differences among countries in their level of development, regulatory 
frameworks and market realities. The process of liberalization should be carried out under the 
appropriate regulatory framework with a view to ensuring the achievement of national policy 
objectives, including public service obligations, and the establishment of fair competition 
conditions. Liberalization should not necessarily be equivalent to deregulation. It should entail re-
regulation in order to ensure the attainment of the above-mentioned goals. (UNCTAD, 2001b, 
para. 8) 
 
Finally, it is important to remember that the degree of freedom enjoyed by national Governments in 
choosing any of these arrangements and in negotiating with transnational corporations is not 
independent from the binding liberalization commitments that may be undertaken during present and 
future WTO negotiations. This self-evident remark should be interpreted as a plea for particular 
caution and vigilance on the part of developing countries￿ WTO negotiators in the domain of 
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